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Instructions
Contact CISCO to agree on the research goals and on their specific needs of a web system to assist the threat
analysis.
Design and develop a web application to assist CISCO researchers, named ManaTI, that will provide web
logs detection, visualization, storage. Develop modules for ManaTI to analyze the web logs in the
background. The modular system should be designed to allow other modules to be added by CISCO.
Study the WHOIS protocol. Research about the possible differences between malicious and normal domains
in the registration of WHOIS data.
Develop an algorithm to find similarities in WHOIS registration data as an external module for ManaTI.
Apply machine learning to find related domains, best distance measures and similarities in WHOIS
registrations.
Evaluate if the web application helps the analysts with their job of labelling weblogs faster and easier.
Evaluate if the algorithm correctly detects related domains using the WHOIS information of a domain given
by the analyst.
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Abstrakt
Na´r˚ust vy´skytu malware a jeho r˚uznorodosti vede k vy´voji novy´ch metod jeho
detekce. Jedn´ım z proble´mu˚, ktery´m mus´ı bezpecˇnost´ı analytici cˇelit je velke´
mnozˇstv´ı dat z provozu na s´ıti, ktere´ je nutne´ manua´lneˇ kontrolovat. Zveˇtsˇuj´ıc´ı
se mnozˇstv´ı dat vede k tomu, zˇe tato rucˇn´ı analy´za je zdlouhava´ a te´zˇ k
na´r˚ustu neprˇesnost´ı. Tento proble´m nasta´va´ i kdyzˇ firmy povoluj´ı uzˇivatel˚um
pouze pouzˇit´ı protokol˚u HTTP a HTTPS, ktere´ cˇasto stacˇ´ı k jejich pra´ci.
Tv˚urci malware se ale adaptuj´ı na tento trend a malware analytici zazna-
menali posun komunikace malware pra´veˇ ke zmı´neˇny´m protokol˚um. Za´kladn´ı
jednotka prˇi analy´ze provozu na s´ıti se nazy´va´ weblog. Prˇestozˇe Analy´za
weblog˚u mu˚zˇe by´t pouzˇita k detekova´n´ı u´tok˚u, tento proces je velice komp-
likovany´ a vyzˇaduje mnoho znalost´ı. Mezi neˇ patrˇ´ı naprˇ´ıklad analy´za vzorc˚u
chova´n´ı nebo vyuzˇit´ı informac´ı ze sluzˇby WHOIS. V obou zmı´neˇny´ch tech-
nika´ch je velmi d˚ulezˇity´ lidsky´ faktor. Protozˇe zajiˇsteˇn´ı prˇesnosti prˇi rucˇn´ım
zpracova´n´ı milion˚u zaznamu˚ je zva´lˇstˇ obt´ızˇny´ u´kol, bezpecˇnostn´ı analytici
potrˇebuj´ı na´stroj, ktery´ tento proces usnadn´ı a urychl´ı. Projekt ManaTI
vznikl jako asistencˇn´ı na´stroj pro bezpecˇnost´ı experty. ManaTI vyuzˇ´ıva´ algor-
itmu˚ strojove´ho ucˇen´ı k urychlen´ı a zprˇesneˇn´ı procesu detekce hrozeb. Projekt
ma´ dva hlavn´ı c´ıle: Za prve´: vytvorˇit webove´ rozhran´ı napoma´haj´ıc´ı ana-
lytik˚um s analy´zou weblog˚u a hleda´n´ım doplnˇuj´ıc´ıch informac´ı o jednotlivy´ch
dome´n. Za druhe´: vyuzˇit´ı strojove´ho ucˇen´ı k vyhleda´va´n´ı a urcˇova´n´ı podob-
nost´ı v informac´ıch ze sluzˇby WHOIS pro jednotlive´ dome´ny. Tato metoda
pracuje na za´kladeˇ vzda´lenost´ı mezi vektory z´ıskany´mi z WHOIS informac´ı
jednotlivy´ch dome´n. Mezi dosazˇene´ vy´sledky patrˇ´ı: Za prve´: pouzˇit´ı na´stroje
ManaTI zvysˇuje rychlost analitika prˇi analy´ze dome´ny v pr˚umeˇru 3,4 kra´t. Za
druhe´: potvrzen´ı hypote´zy, zˇe prˇ´ıbuzne´ dome´ny maj´ı meˇrˇitelne´ podobnosti v
informac´ıch sluzˇby WHOIS a je tedy mozˇne´ tyto informace pouzˇ´ıt k prˇesne´
klasifikaci. Za trˇet´ı: experimenty ukazuj´ı, zˇe neˇktere´ z informac´ı ve WHOIS
maj´ı na prˇesnost klasifikace za´sadn´ı vliv, zat´ımco jine´ ji te´meˇrˇ neovlivnˇuj´ı.
Prˇesnost metody ve vyhleda´va´n´ı prˇ´ıbuzny´ch dome´n za pomoc´ı WHOIS je
prˇiblizˇneˇ 98%.
ix
Kl´ıcˇova´ slova Malware, WHOIS, Dome´ny, Strojove´ ucˇen´ı, Software, Ky-
berneticka´ bezpecˇnost
Abstract
The increasing diversity and amount of malware tra c is pushing researchers
to find better detection methods. When security practitioners analyze such
large amount of tra c, they are usually overwhelmed and, therefore they ana-
lyze each time less tra c with less accuracy. This overwhelming problem data
happens even when companies filter out part of their outgoing tra c. Given
that users inside a company mostly need web services to work, it is usual
only allow web tra c is going out of the enterprise. However, malware is
aware of this filtering, and in the last years, we have witnessed a shift in mal-
ware towards using web services for their connections. For analyzing HTTP/S
tra c, the default unit of analysis is called a weblog, from a log for the web
tra c. These weblogs are used to find threats in the network, but a significant
amount of expertise is needed for doing so. The required knowledge ranges
from looking for domains which have been reported as malicious, to analyzing
the patterns in the URLs and using the WHOIS information of the domains.
These techniques highly depend on humans. All in all, analyzing millions of
weblogs with speed and accuracy, balancing the amount of information and
finding threats is at least a daunting task. Security analysts need a tool to
help them organize their work and a machine learning algorithm that can im-
prove the detection and speed up the analysis. It is in this context that we
researched and created a new tool to assist the network security analysts to
find threats: the ManaTI project. This project has two primary goals: First,
to help analysts by means of a web interface, in evaluating the weblogs to
better find and process the information. Second, to create a machine learn-
ing method that can identify domains which share some similarity in their
WHOIS Information. Our algorithm can work as a WHOIS classification of
similar domains also called WHOIS similarity distance. The conclusions of our
research are: First, ManaTI can increase the speed of the security analysts
by a factor of 3.4. Second, the WHOIS information of related domains has
quantifiable similarities that make possible an accurate comparison. Third,
x
there are WHOIS fields which are more important for relating domains than
others. Finally, the accuracy of finding related domains using a linear model
classifier based on the WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm is around 98%.
Keywords Malware, WHOIS, Domains, Machine Learning, Software, Cy-
bersecurity
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Introduction
Cyber-attacks are much more severe threat nowadays than several years ago
[1]. Not only the number of devices increased exponentially, but also the
amount of attackers increased, and their motivations changed substantially.
Any device connected to the Internet may be vulnerable, and they are likely
to be used to perform attacks to others computers around the world without
authorization.
Malware, short for Malicious Software, refers to software designed to per-
form attacks or do unauthorized actions on a computer [2]. The purposes of
malware vary, but commonly they include to steal sensitive information and to
attack other computers. The information stolen can range from credit cards,
bank information, to personal data. Fortunately, there is plenty of people
working in cyber-security that deals with this issue through the analyses of
network tra c [3].
The e↵orts to prevent these situations are extensive. However, the amount
of new malware created every day increases continuously. The Figure 1.1
illustrates a statistic graph of the numbers of malware in the range between
March 2015 and February 2017 according to an estimation of “The AV-TEST
Institute”. It registers over 390,000 new malicious programs every day [4].
Despite the massive e↵orts of AntiVirus companies, their work to stop mal-
ware may not be enough. Detecting, understanding and providing solutions
for new malware are hard tasks. Security researchers are trying to understand
how malware’s families work and how is the communication process between
malware and their controllers. Typically, modern malware needs to commu-
nicate with their controllers to receive orders and receive information. The
channels used for communication are called Command and Control (C&C)
channels [5].
Among the most used methods to find new threats in a network is the
analysis of HTTP tra c. Since most organizations only allow this protocol to
reach the Internet, most internal attacks and malware use it for communica-
tion. The default unit of analysis is usually called weblog, from a log for the
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Figure 1.1: It shows the new malware created in the range between March
2015 and February 2017. X-axis shows the numbers of malware created and
y-axis, the month when they were created.
web tra c. Security analysts use weblogs to detect threats[6].
Analyzing millions of weblogs with speed and accuracy, balancing the
amount of information and finding threats is a daunting task. Security ana-
lysts need a tool to help them organize their work and a machine learning
algorithm that can improve the detection and speed up the analysis. For this
reason was developed ManaTI, to assist the analysts, organize their work and
provide tools to enhance their analysis.
One of the characteristics of the Internet is that to obtain a new domain; it
has to be bought from certain registered entities. These entities request some
information about the buyer in order to create the domain. This information is
called WHOIS information (or WHOIS data). Some researchers have already
tried to detect malicious domains and di↵erentiate them of legitimate domains
using the WHOIS information. One of the goals of this thesis is to propose
a Machine Learning method to find a relationship between domains used for
the same purpose by using their WHOIS data. Our method is designed to
work regardless of whether the domains are malicious or not. The result of
our method is both, a distance measure between domains and a classification
algorithm of similar domains.
Machine Learning techniques have been used to detect malicious domains
and predict malware behavior successfully before[7]. However, in most cases,
2
Background
the errors produced by Machine Learning algorithms are still too large to be
acceptable
Frequently, the task of the security researchers that work finding threats
involves complex expert knowledge. This experience ranges from searching
domains which have being reported as malicious to analyzing the patterns in
the URLs and using the WHOIS information of the domains. Although these
techniques may work for the average analyst, they highly depend on humans
generating the reputation rules and on the malware being analyzed. This
thesis focuses on the analysis of weblogs.
It is in this context, Cisco and Faculty of Electrical Engineering of the
Czech Technical University in Prague collaborated to create the ManaTI pro-
ject in the Stratosphere Lab [8]. This thesis is one part of this collaboration
where I researched, created and published a new tool to help the network se-
curity analysts to find threats in the network called ManaTI. This thesis has
two main goals:
• To create a web application called ManaTI to assist the analysts in
evaluating the web tra c to find better and process the information.
• To research a machine learning method that can confidently identify
domains which WHOIS information is related. The idea of our algorithm
is to work as a WHOIS classification of similar domains or as a WHOIS
Similarity Distance.
As part of the evaluation of ManaTI and the distance measure, through
experiments were conducted. The WHOIS Similarity Distance was evaluated
to know its performance and ManaTI was assessed to know how much it helps
the analysts.
This thesis is organized as follows: Section introduces the Background
information about the topics discussed. The section describes state of the
art. Then there are two chapters to discuss the two most important parts
of this thesis: Chapter 2 describes the WHOIS similarity measure and the
classification algorithm, and Chapter 3 describes the web application ManaTI.
Finally, Section 3.4.1 presents the conclusion of the thesis.
Background
This section introduces relevant topics to the correct understanding of the
methods proposed and the necessary to discern the problem correctly.
The main subjects of this thesis are network security, malware tra c ana-
lysis, assisting the threat analyst and the use of WHOIS information for finding
similar domains. Also, it is necessary to understand the concepts of weblogs
and why ManaTI uses them.
3
Introduction
Cyber security
Computer security, also known as cyber security or IT security, has increased
in the last years. The problem of data security has taken the attention of
the media and governments, nowadays the work in the area is made of more
importance. Computer security is not only focused on protecting the ma-
chines physically, but also it must take care of the most critical aspect of
computers, the data [9]. Cyber security includes controlling physical access
to the hardware, as well as protecting against the harm that may come via
network access, data, and code injection [9].
Malware Short for malicious software, malware refers to software programs
designed to damage or do other unauthorized actions on a computer system
[2]. They are used to steal potentially sensible data, like numbers of credit
cards, password of web-banking, until getting full access to your device. They
could be a laptop, computer, tablet, mobile or others.
Malware is an umbrella term used to refer to a variety of forms of hos-
tile or intrusive software, including computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses,
ransomware, spyware, adware, scareware, and other malicious programs [10].
Ransomware One the most widely extended and dangerous malware are
the ransomware, it a↵ects an infected computer encrypting data, databases, or
removing some files from the computer.Then it demands payment to reverse
the damage.
Weblogs files The weblog is a composition of “web” and “log”, basically
means that is a register of an HTTP tra c. Weblogs is a log of HTTP requests
and responses occurred during a period in the network tra c of a device. In
simple words is a log file of everything sent or received using the HTTP pro-
tocol (in the Web)[11]. The following table illustrates an example of an HTTP
GET request:
POST /cgi-bin/process.cgi HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)
Host: www.tutorialspoint.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: length
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: Keep-Alive
licenseID=string&content=string&/paramsXML=string
Then the HTTP tra c (request or response) is converted by special tools
to a weblog, something similar as the Figure ??1:
1The weblog example only has the most common and important fields of the most
commons structures
4
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212.555548 192.168.1.115 49161 23.21.92.252 80 POST i-50.b-000.xyz.bench.utorrent.com /e?i=50 text/json
Figure 1.2: Example of HTTP tra c.
ManaTI supports weblogs files produced by Bro project2. Bro is a tool
for network security monitoring. Bro has many functions, but one of them
can extract information of PCAP (Packet CAPture) files. And it can provide
a http.log file where has all the HTTP connection in the PCAP selected;
http.log is an example of weblogs file. Bro files were chosen to be compatible
with ManaTI for several reasons:
• It has good documentation,
• Its use is widely extended in the network security monitoring area,
• Its weblogs format is easy to understand,
• The malware tra c captures provided by Stratosphere Lab use the Bro
format for their weblogs [12].
Also, ManaTI provides support to the Cisco weblogs file format. It is a
type of format only used by the researchers working in Cisco.
Cisco’s research with weblogs The Cognitive Threat Analytics (CTA)
group inside Cisco System, is in charge of analyzing weblogs in order to detect
attacks and infections. They have software and methods that can analyze
weblogs and identify possible malicious behaviors. The weblogs used are stored
in a particular format used by Cisco. Their software and algorithms can
process the weblogs to find anomalies, infections and attacks. However, the
verification of the errors from the algorithms must be made by hand by the
threat security analysts.
The most important tasks of the threat analysts is to study the tra c of
one client device in a short period in order to find if it is infected or not.
The tra c analyzed is represented in their custom weblog format. Typically
the weblog files has between 2,000 and 10,000 lines. Such a large amount of
weblogs per device makes the task of finding new threats and attacks very
time consuming and prone to errors.
The analysis of weblogs requires advanced skills to understand the flow
and communication state of the weblogs. After this analysis, a verdict should
be assigned to each weblog. The verdicts can be:
• Legitimate: it is used to label weblogs that the analyst knows normal
and therefore they are not related to any attack or infection,
2www.bro.org
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• Malicious: it is used to label weblogs that are related to malware actions
or somehow used by malware,
• Suspicious: it is used to label weblogs that the analyst is not sure about.
The weblog may show some connections with malware or attacks but it
can be also be highly connected to normal domains,
• False Positive: it is used on weblogs that were labeled as malicious
before, but now the analyst is sure this was an error. However, it is
important to remember the error to further improve the algorithms.
ManaTI was specially created for the task of assisting the analysts to study
weblogs faster and more e ciently.
DNS
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical decentralized naming sys-
tem for computers, devices, services and other resources connected to private
networks or the Internet and it has been in use since 1985. In essential the work
of the DNS is translates more readily memorized domain names to the numer-
ical IP addresses. For locating and identifying services and devices inside a
network protocol. By providing a worldwide, distributed directory service,
the Domain Name System is an essential component of the functionality of
the Internet [13] [14]. In Figure 1.2 illustrates the workflow of a request for a
website.
Domain name It is “the part of a network address which identifies it as
belonging to a particular domain” [15]. Also, the domain name is an identi-
fication string that determines a field of administrative autonomy, authority
or control within the Internet.
Domains are organized in levels; the first level is for top-level domains
(TLDs), including the generic top-level domains (gTLDs), such as the prom-
inent domains .com, .info, .net, .edu, and .org, and the country code top-level
domains (ccTLDs).
The levels belong of these in the DNS hierarchy are typically open for
reservation by end-users who can connect local area networks to the Internet.
In Figure 1.3 the reader could see examples of how the DNS hierarchy works
[16].
In the rest of the book when the author refer domain name is specially
referring to the domains names in the TLDs and second level domain.
Malicious and legitimate domains Legitimate or normal domains are
domains which belong to real entities or for a true purpose. Entities could
be private or governmental companies, regular people, organizations, projects,
marketing or educational use, etc. However, malicious domains are domains
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Figure 1.3: DNS basic workflow.
which are used to propagate malware, belong to bot or ransomware networks
or created with a malicious purpose like phishing or spam campaign.
WHOIS Protocol
WHOIS is a TCP-Based transaction oriented query and response protocol is
typically used to provide information about Internet services to the users [17].
WHOIS information When an entity wants to register a web domain,
encompasses normal users, organization, governments, companies and others.
They need to provide some contact information, like for examples: name of
the entity, phone number, contacts’ emails, name, address, and more details
to identify the owner of the domain. This information is called WHOIS in-
formation or WHOIS data [18].
Although the WHOIS service is not a single, centrally-operated database,
there are many companies in charge of registering the domains and hence, to
ask the owner information, these companies are called registrars and regis-
tries. Any entity that wants to become a registrar must have the approved
and accreditation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) [18].
There is not a standard structure of the WHOIS information. And it is not
mandatory for the registrars fill in all fields. Often they do not use the same
name of fields for the same information, e.g. Some registrars to specify the
7
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Figure 1.4: The examples of domain naming hierarchy.
date of creation of a domain, use the key field created at and others registrars
use creation date.
Domain Name: ASM.COM
Registrar: NETWORK SOLUTIONS, LLC.
Sponsoring Registrar IANA ID: 2
Whois Server: whois.networksolutions.com
Referral URL: http://networksolutions.com
Name Server: CBRU.BR.NS.ELS-GMS.ATT.NET
Name Server: CMTU.MT.NS.ELS-GMS.ATT.NET
Status: clientTransferProhibited
Updated Date: 12-sep-2014
Creation Date: 07-oct-1997
Expiration Date: 06-oct-2019
Figure 1.5: WHOIS information of asm.com.
WHOIS features In this work when the author refers to WHOIS features
is talking about the extracted fields of the WHOIS information of domains,
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being utilized in the WHOIS distance algorithm explained later in the chapter
2. The reader can find more information about WHOIS features in the section
2.1.
State of the Art
One of the objectives of this thesis is to propose a distance algorithm to relate
domains using their WHOIS information. ManaTI does not pretend to detect
malicious domains. However, it can connect malicious domains from previous
domains analyzed.
WHOIS Similarity Distance
To achieve the WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm is necessary to under-
stand the characteristics of legitimate and malicious domains, and the tech-
niques used to detect malicious domains. In others words, how di↵erent or
similar are malicious domains on normal domains. WHOIS Similarity Distance
must be able to relate domains, no matter if they are malicious or legitimate
domains.
Bilge et al. have proposed a system called EXPOSURE, used to classify
malicious/legitimate domains in real time [19]. The system uses 15 features
grouped in 4 categories and the classifier is the J48 algorithm. The exper-
imentation took around 17 months; they were using real-time dataset and
o✏ine logs. The system works fine in practice, and it has a high rate of detec-
tion, only 1% of false positive rate. Also, the system EXPOSURE has some
limitation, for example, it depends on the feature selection, and the attacker
could try to avoid it.
In the case of Shuang Hao et al. they have not proposed a system, but
they provided a good acknowledgment of the behavior of malicious domains
in their work “Monitoring the Initial DNS Behavior of Malicious Domains”
[6]. They found that the malicious domains have some characteristics:
• Resource records of malicious domains tend to resolve to particular IP
address range and Autonomous Systems (AS). The legitimate domains
rarely have resource files within the tainted AS set that host scam do-
mains,
• They discovered that malicious domains display distinct clusters, regard-
ing the networks that are searching these domains,
• They found that malicious domains become widely popular more quickly
after their initial registration time.
Further, Shuang Hao et al. explain to us that the legitimate and malicious
domains have characteristics and it may be possible to fingerprint domains
9
Introduction
based on their resource records and lookup tra c of TLD name servers before
and attack.
Masahiro Kuyama et al. have proposed a “Method for Detecting a Mali-
cious Domain by using WHOIS and DNS features” [20]. They design a method
for detecting the Command and Control server (C&C) by using supervised ma-
chine learning (SML) using obtained feature from WHOIS information and
DNS of domains of C&C servers and legitimate domains.
The feature points collected of email addresses used for C&C domains
as contact information. With this information was proposed a method to
determine C&C servers by using machine learning with WHOIS and DNS
information. Furthermore, they classified the features of WHOIS information
of C&C domains, by showing a relation of words of extracted email addresses
in the co-occurrence networks. Lastly, they evaluated domain names and email
addresses from the WHOIS information as input values for machine learning.
They obtained as result of the experiment 98.5 % of rate detection.
Letal, V. in his master’s thesis have proposed “Discovering of malicious
domains using WHOIS database”. It is about a reputation based system which
is using WHOIS information to be able to give an estimation of maliciousness.
This system also can work even for domains which have not appeared in
blacklists or were not previously observed.
Based on information extracted from WHOIS records, the system learns
the behavior of observed domains and it can generalize to other unobserved
domains. Its model is probabilistic and uses Variational Bayes to determine
its parameters.
To do the experiments were used proxy logs from a primary Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS). The system has a reasonable false positive rate,
around 0.03%, with 52% true positive rates and a precision of 92%. Also, the
system only works for o↵-line learning.
Relation with WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm
As far we know, it does not exist an algorithm or implementation which try to
create distance between the WHOIS information of domains and relate them.
Weblogs
As far we know, does not exist a software to assist analysts like ManaTI does
it. There is much software to visualize weblogs, but any of them provide tools
to analyze them. They are mostly focused on system administrator task or as
HTTP logs viewer. The following software are weblogs viewer:
• Apache-scalp
• Apache Log Viewer
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The AI2 system assists the analysts, but it is more focused in detection
malicious behavior than providing tools for the analyst. AI2 has become a
commercial application 3. Kalyan Veeramachaneni et al. proposed a system
called AI2, “Training a big data machine to defend” [21]. AI2 is a system
where Analyst Intuition (AI) is put together with current and well-proved
machine learning algorithm to build a complete end-to-end Artificially Intel-
ligent solution (AI). AI2 tries to learn from the analyst behavior and from
machine learning algorithm for detecting malicious behavior. The Figure 1.5
illustrates a small summary of how AI2 works.
Figure 1.6: Workflow of how AI2.
The system has four keys features:
• a platform to analyze big data
• a modeler for outlier events
• Logic to learn of security analysts through their feedback
• and a supervised learning module for detecting and determining mali-
cious behavior
The system was validated with a real-world data with 3.6 billion log lines.
It can learn to defend against unobserved attacks. And on supervised outlier
analysis, the software can improve the detection rate in 2.92 times and reduce
false positives by more than five times. AI2 is part of our motivation for
ManaTI, although ideally, ManaTI is thought only to assist analysts. In the
future we want to allow the system to learn from the analysts’ behavior to
improve their e ciency.
3www.patternex.com
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Assisting tools and testing
As far as we know, do not exist published techniques to measure or diagnostic
the usability of an assisting tool especially in the area of cybersecurity.
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Chapter 2
WHOIS Similarity Distance
Method
Frequently the domains of one company or organization share common in-
formation in the WHOIS data; like contacts’ emails, organization names or
others. The situation for malicious domains is similar; domains registered by
the same person or for the same purpose very often repeat some characteristics
in their WHOIS data and also typical patterns of malicious domains [22].
The use of WHOIS information for malware detection has been studied and
has gotten good results [20] [23]. Detecting malware domains using WHOIS
information is possible to some.... Therefore this research goes further to try
a method to measure a distance between domains called WHOIS Similarity
Distance and find a way to relate them. Several domains are connected if they
share the minimum number of relevant information in the WHOIS data.
To accomplish this goal, several fields from WHOIS information were ex-
tracted and analyzed of many records. Taking account the more relevant and
usual fields of the WHOIS data. Also were studied several libraries of Python
to get the WHOIS records.
2.1 Feature selection
The registrars provide WHOIS information, and they can share the informa-
tion using their structure. Therefore the fields names (key) can di↵er among
registrars. And also, some information can be missed. For that reason were
selected several key features (or fields) for the algorithm. These essential
features must be discriminative. The list of the selected features is the next:
1. Basic contact information
a) Registrar’s name kn,
b) Contact’s name or registrant’s name kcn.
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c) Organization’s name ko ,
d) Contacts emails ke ,
e) Post address or zip code kp,
f) Domain’s name kd.
2. Duration of a domain
a) The numbers of days counted between from creation date and ex-
piration date of the domain kpd,
3. Domains’ name Server
a) Servers’ name kns,
Each domain d is represented as a set of featuresKd = (kn, ko, ke, kp, kpd, kns, kd, kcn).
2.1.0.1 Basic contact information
The basic information typically provided by all registrars are registrar’s name
kn, contact’s name kcn, organization’s name ko, contacts emails ke and post
address or zip code kp. They are tested to be useful for detecting malicious
domains [20] or rather, for getting a prior estimate about maliciousness of
domains d [23].
2.1.0.2 Duration of a domain
This feature, the numbers of days between creation date and the expiration
date kpd is selected because it helps to propose a di↵erentiating feature for
legitimate or malicious domains. Typically the legitimate domains are created
for terms greater or equal to 2 years (  720 days); however, the malicious
domains often have a shorter duration [24] [22]. Although, it is also common
that some malware source hijacks old normal domains and uses them for its
purpose.
The Figure 2.1 shows a comparison between 236 random normal domains
and 236 malicious domains used by the Locky ransomware network. The
Figure 2.1a shows the sorted years duration of the domains, from the longest
to the shortest. The average of duration:
• Normal domains are around ten years;
• Malicious domains is around two years. Also, some malicious domains
showed in the Figure 2.1a have a period more than a decade; we suppose
that those domains were hijacking.
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(a) Sorted years of duration per sample, from
the longest to the shortest. The plot of the left
side represents the duration of normal domains
and the plot of the right side is about the mali-
cious (Locky) domains.
(b) Distribution of the years of duration of Lock-
y/Normal domains separated.
(c) Distribution of the years of duration of Lock-
y/Normal domains together.
Figure 2.1 Comparison of duration between 236 normal domains and 236 ma-
licious domains used by Locky ransomware. The distribution of the years of
duration of Locky/Normals domains. Locky’s domains have high probability
to have a duration of between 1 and 2 years, and normal domains have high
probability to have a duration between 8 - 10 years. The normal domains have
more uniform distribution than malicious domains.
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Figures 2.1b 2.1c represent the distribution of the duration of the selected
normal and Locky domains. The first plot separates the distributions and the
second plot put together. The x-axis represents the range of years length of the
selected domains and y-axis represents the probability to get that duration.
The Locky domains have more probability to have two years of duration than
normal domains. Normal domains have a high likelihood of having a duration
around 10 years. And also normal domains have a distribution more uniform
than the Locky domains.
2.1.0.3 Domains’ name Server
Domains of several entities could be hosted by same servers, this is a relation-
ship between them. The relationship could be high or not depend on the case
[20].
2.2 Datasets - WHOIS records
The used domains were found in several entities’ websites and other websites
for researcher purposes. To choose the legitimate domains, it must be con-
fident that they belong either to a regulated entity or well-known company
or use. For determining malicious domains, they must be reported as being
used by a malware network. Legitimate domains were downloaded from the
website OpenDNS 4 or using the YouGetSignal.com 5 tool to do Reverse IP
Domain Check. And also it was used lists of well-known companies domains
as Facebook, Google, Apple, Cisco, Microsoft, Oracle, Twitter, Toyota, HP,
IBM, Amazon, Intel, Qualcomm, Xerox, eBay, Danaher, Thermofisher, Mi-
cron, Jabil, WDC, CSC, Ti and others.
Malicious domains were obtained from the following projects:
• DNS-BH - Malware Domain Blocklist6,
• Malware Domains List7,
• Ransomware Tracker8.
More especially the following malware families were used:
• CryptoWall Ransomware [25],
• Locky Ransomware [26] ,
4www.opendns.com
5www.yougetsignal.com/tools/web-sites-on-web-server/
6www.malwaredomains.com
7www.malwaredomainlist.com
8ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch
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• TeslaCrypt Ransomware [27],
• TorrentLocker Ransomware [28].
In total, we have approximately 1300 domains, which were labeled if they
are malicious or legitimate domains and by the relationship with some entity
or purpose. In this thesis, we refer to a malicious purpose for examples:
malware’s network, phishing campaign, and others.
2.2.0.1 Tools for getting the WHOIS records
Registrants can provide the WHOIS information in di↵erent formats, therefore
was necessary to adapt to a format for the experiments. There are several tools
which provide di↵erent formats also is common that no all of them contain the
same information fields, often some fields are empty or directly do not exist.
For this experiment was used four WHOIS libraries of Python:
• pythonwhois (pw) 9,
• virustotal (vt) 10,
• passivetotal (pt)11,
• whois (ww) 12.
For testing the listed libraries were realized the next tasks:
1. to get the WHOIS information of all our available domains,
2. to extract the necessary features for the algorithm,
3. and count how many of them have all the features (fields) filled,
4. in the end, it was taken an average of all the WHOIS feature domain
per library
The table 2.1 shows in average the percentage of selected features filled by
the libraries.
This experiment concluded that the most e cient library to get WHOIS
information of domains is passivetotal. To use the PassiveTotal’s API (used
by library selected) is necessary to have an account. All the experiments made
for the Whois Similarity Distance algorithm was used information provide by
PassiveTotal’s tool, but for the WHOIS Similarity Distance module imple-
mented in ManaTI is used the library pythonwhois.
9https://pypi.python.org/pypi/pythonwhois
10https://github.com/nu11p0inter/virustotal/
11https://pypi.python.org/pypi/passivetotal
12https://pypi.python.org/pypi/python-whois
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Library Average percentage of obtained features
VirusTotal 43%
python-whois (pywhois) 60%
pythonwhois 76%
Passive Total 89%
Table 2.1: Comparison of the studied libraries to get WHOIS information in
Python. Exist 8 features for the WHOIS Similarity Distance obtained from
the WHOIS information. Not all the tools obtained all the features. This table
show that the library of Passive Total obtained in average the most amount
of features per domain.
2.2.0.2 Grouping Domains
During this research was necessary to see the WHOIS information of each
domain, which could be malicious or not. Because:
• To be sure of data provided by the libraries and compare them with
di↵erent WHOIS providers,
• To search for patterns to relate domains,
• To compare di↵erent WHOIS data structure and find things in common,
• For processing the WHOIS information also is necessary to handle the
encoding of the data, especially for non-Latin characters. It was a need
to see which characters encodes would be required.
And after this, we learned that: some domains even if they belong to some
group or entity, may di↵er their WHOIS information, sometimes the domains
do not share information in common; the registrars allocated outside of Europe
or USA often use di↵erent structures and sometimes omit some fields; dealing
with non-Latin characters is hard task. In table 2.2 compares the WHOIS
information of two well know domains: instagram.com and facebook.com; both
domains belong to the company Facebook Inc. The information that they
share are: one contact email and the zip code. The table information was
obtained from DomainTool13.
The WHOIS features of domains of the same entity were compared meas-
uring the distances between themselves. The distance, in this case is a numeric
sum of the distances features of those domains. In the section 2.3.1, the reader
can see how this WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm works. The result ob-
tained can be appreciated in Figure 2.2.
With this experiment was learned that often domains of the same group do
not have the same WHOIS information but could share some data. So it was
13http://whois.domaintools.com
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WHOIS fields Instagram.com Facebook.com
domain’s name instagram.com facebook.com
Registrar REGISTRARSEC LLC MARKMONITOR INC.
Registrant name Domain Admin Domain Administrator
Registrant Org Instagram, LLC Facebook, Inc.
Email [abusecomplaints@ [abusecomplaints@
registrarsec.com, markmonitor.com,
domain@fb.com] domain@fb.com]
Creation Date 2004-06-04 1997-03-29
Expiration Date 2022-06-04 2025-03-30
Zip code 94025 94025
Name Server(s) [NS-1349.AWSDNS-40.ORG, [a.ns.facebook.com,
NS-384.AWSDNS-48.COM, b.ns.facebook.com]
NS-2016.AWSDNS-60.CO.UK,
NS-868.AWSDNS-44.NET]
Table 2.2: Although instagram.com and facebook.com belong to the same com-
pany (Facebook Inc.), they do not have same WHOIS information. However,
in this example we can see that they share one contact email and the zipcode.
Figure 2.2: We expected that the distance between domains of the same group
should be close to zero, with this plot we can see that this assumption is false.
Still, the average distance to sort out the groups is not infinite and is close to
100.
decided to create subgroups of the groups (or entities) manually and only have
been chosen for the WHOIS Similarity Distance’s experiments the subgroups
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with more than ten elements. This because if we have only a few items that
belong to the same subgroups could go unnoticed in the tests. Figure 2.3
represents the same dataset of the Figure 2.2 but separated in sub-group were
the WHOIS Similarity Distance tends to zero.
Figure 2.3: After the sub-grouping were obtained groups like was needed, well
separated and related between them. And with the WHOIS distance inside
the subgroups tending to zero.
2.2.0.3 Construction of training and testing dataset
The used dataset is a comparison between all the domains available for this
thesis. The distances of each feature are stored with references to the com-
pared domains. Also, a boolean field is saved to identify if both compared
domains are related according to the sources where were acquired the do-
mains. In total, we have around 172.000 comparisons. Of these comparisons,
randomly, 80% were used to train and choose the proper linear model classi-
fier. And the rest 20% were used to get the finals results of the most suitable
algorithm. This topic will be addressed in more detail in the section 2.3.1.2.
2.3 Domains Distance Proposed
One of the objectives of this research is to create a method which would be able
to calculate a numeric distance between two domains (dA and dB) and relate
them using their WHOIS information called WHOIS Similarity Distance.
The next section is talking about the WHOIS relation algorithm between
two domains also with the experiments performed and their respective results.
At the end, the reader could see experiments made with the idea to compare
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and analyze: the numeric distance algorithm between two domains and the
algorithm to determine if they are related or not.
For plotting all the results of the experiments made, was used the Python
library called Matplotlib [29].
2.3.1 WHOIS Similarity Distance
The numeric value of the WHOIS Similarity Distance method is obtained
comparing two domains. The value is a sum of the string distance obtained
per selected feature of the compared domains. The numeric value of WHOIS
Similarity Distance also is called Global Distance (GD).
DistT (dA, dB) =
nX
i=1
distki(kidA , kidB ) (2.1)
where:
• dA, dB WHOIS information of the domains A and B
• kidA and kidA the i-features of the domains A and B
• distki(kidA , kidB ): the distance between the i-feature of the domain A
and B.
• DistT (dA, dB) : The Global Distance of WHOIS information of two
domains.
2.3.1.1 Distance per features
When the algorithm measures distance, takes the WHOIS feature of the two
domains A and B. And it compares the string distance distki(kidA , kidB , ...) of
each duple of features. The table 2.3 is comparing the WHOIS information of
google.com and facebook.com demonstrates how WHOIS Similarity Distance
works:
For measuring the individuals distances distki are used the following rules:
• If the features kidA and kidB , are strings, the distance is obtained us-
ing the Levenshtein algorithm for strings distances [31]. Levenshtein
algorithm is a well know method to measure a distance between texts.
The distance provided is the number of changes necessary to convert one
string to the another. The “ number of changes” refers to numbers of to
insert a character, remove a character and change the order. The Figure
2.4 code in Python, shows examples of how the Levenshtein algorithm
works:
• If i-feature has an array of strings (for example contact’s emails), all the
elements of both arrays are compared using their string distance, and
the final result is the shorter distance (or shorter comparison).
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Features list
kid
WHOIS info A WHOIS info B
Numeric
Distance
distki(kidA , kidB )
kn registrar’s
name
MARKMONITOR
INC.
MARKMONITOR
INC.
0.0
kcn contact’s
name.
DNS Admin
Domain Adminis-
trator
13.0
ko org.’s name Google Inc. Facebook, Inc. 8.0
ke contacts
emails
[dns-
admin@google.com]
[domain@fb.com] 11.0
kp zip code 94043 94025 2.0
kd domain’s
name
google.com facebook.com 8.0
kpd duration in
days
8401 10229 0.82
kns servers’
name
[ns1.google.com,...]
[a.ns.facebook.com
...]
11.0
Global Distance DistT (dA, dB) = 53.82
Table 2.3: Comparison of the WHOIS information of google.com and face-
book.com
1 import Levenshte in
2 pr in t ( Levenshte in . d i s t anc e ( ‘ goog l e e . com ’ , ‘ goog l e . com ’ ) )
3 # output >> 1
4 pr in t ( Levenshte in . d i s t anc e ( ‘ t o og l e . com ’ , ‘ goog l e . com ’ ) )
5 # output >> 1
6 pr in t ( Levenshte in . d i s t anc e ( ‘ t o og l e e . com ’ , ‘ goog l e . com ’ ) )
7 # output >> 2
8 pr in t ( Levenshte in . d i s t anc e ( ‘ goog l e . . com ’ , ‘ goog l e . com ’ ) )
9 # output >> 1
10 pr in t ( Levenshte in . d i s t anc e ( ‘ gg looe . com ’ , ‘ goog l e . com ’ ) )
11 # output >> 4
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Figure 2.4: Example in Python how to do Leveshtein Distance
• In the case of the numbers of days between two dates kpd, it is taking a
ratio between both values kpd. The ratio gets a decimal number between
0 and 1. So if two domains have a similar number of days of duration,
the result is closer to zero. Otherwise is the number of days is di↵erent,
the result is closer to 1.
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2.3.1.2 Experiments with WHOIS Similarity Distance
The WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm is used to have a numeric distance
of the WHOIS information of two domains . Theoretically, it could identify
related domains without regard if the domains are malicious or legitimate.
And supposing that the weights of the features are equals, that is, all the
features have the same importance. To achieve that is necessary to define a
threshold.
Using a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is possible to find
the most optimums threshold to relate domains. Setting a range of possible
thresholds between 0 and 200 in Figure 2.5, we can appreciate that the apogee
value is 75 of Global Distance. However, it would have a True Positive Rate
(TPR) of 50% and around 30% for the False Positive Rate (FPR). The number
75 was found searching the shorter distance between the point TPR equal
100% and FPR equal 0%.
Figure 2.5: ROC curve of algorithm using all samples available. It is the
result obtained using a thresholds’ range between 0 and 200. Looking the plot
is posible to see that the optimum threshold with weights equal to 1 is 75,
with 50% of TPR and 30% of FPR.
The error is wide; it has only around 50% of chances to relate correctly
two domains. In this experiment, it was learned that some features are more
important that others. To get better results is necessary to apply a classifier
algorithm to find the correct weights for the features.
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2.3.2 Classification Based on the WHOIS Similarity Distance
For the WHOIS Similarity Distance is needed to define a threshold for the
distance to relate two domains. In the section before was learned that some
features are more important than others. To facilitate the task of looking for
the correct weights and threshold, we decided to use a classifier algorithm. For
this work were chosen linear model algorithms. The implementations of the
linear models classifiers were obtained from the Python library ScikitLearn
[32].
The classifiers analyzed were Linear Regression and Polynomial Regression
algorithms with degree 2 and 3 [33]. These classifiers were selected for several
reasons:
• The selected classifiers are well known, and there are much documenta-
tion about their results,
• Their implementations are not hard to do,
• They are fast to train if we compare with Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifiers or Polynomial Regression with degree 4. And also
their predict function is not time-consuming,
• Once the coe cients are trained, they can be changed manually. Using
some techniques the user can modify the factors, doing the classifier
more or less sensitive, without need to train the classifier again. This
was not done in this thesis, and we let it as a future line.
2.3.2.1 Linear Models
Linear models were mostly developed before the computer age of statistics.
Nowadays they are being studied with good results. One main characteristic
of linear models is their simplicity, and they provide a good description of how
the inputs a↵ect the output. When the number of training dataset is small,
they can produce better results than nonlinear models [34].
For the experiments were done two linear models algorithms: Linear Re-
gression and Polynomial Regression.
2.3.2.2 Linear regression model
A linear regression model assumes that the regression function E(Y |X) is
linear in the inputs X1, ..., Xp. The input vector XT = (X1, X2, ..., Xp) 14 is
provided, and want to predict a real-valued output Y . The linear regression
function has the form:
f(X) =  0 +
pX
j=1
Xj j (2.2)
14T indicates Transposed
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In Linear regression, the linear predictor functions are estimated from the
data. The most commonly used is the conditional mean of y given the value
of X, is assumed to be an a ne function of X. Linear regression concentrates
on the conditional probability distribution of y given X.
Linear Regression was the first type of regression analysis being studied
and to be applied in practical situations. Because models have a linear de-
pendency of unknown parameters are easier to find than model with non-linear
parameters, and also the statistical properties of the resulting estimators are
easier to understand and determine.
Linear Regression has many practical approaches. The following are some
of them:
• It can be used for prediction, anticipate, or error reduction,
• It analysis can be applied to quantify the clout of the relationship
between y and the Xj .
Given a data set {xi1, ..., xip, yi}ni=1 of n units. A Linear Regression model
assumes that the variable yi and the regressors xi has a linear relationship. It
is necessary to add a disturbance term or error variable "i. This variable "i is
an unobserved random variable that adds noise to the linear model between
yi and the regressor xi. The prediction formula yi
yi =  01 +  1xi1 + · · ·+  pxip + "i = xTi   + "i, i = 1, . . . , n, (2.3)
where T denotes the transpose, so that xTi   is the inner product between
vectors xi and   [34].
y =
0BBB@
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y2
...
yn
1CCCA X =
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xT1
xT2
...
xTn
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also, it could be expressed using a matrix as:
y = X  + ", (2.4)
2.3.2.3 Polynomial regression models
Polynomial Regression is a form of Linear Regression. Where the relationship
between x and the dependent variable y is represented as a polynomial in
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x of n-th degree. It uses nonlinear relationship between the value of x and
the conditional mean of y, stand for E(y|x). Polynomial Regression could be
utilized for the growth rate of tissues, the distribution of carbon isotopes in
lake sediments and progression of disease epidemics.
Polynomial Regression is considered to be a special case of multiple linear
regression. Because Polynomial Regression fits in a nonlinear model to the
data, as a statistical estimation problem it is linear.
In simple linear regression, the model is y = a0+ a1x+ ". However in this
model, for each unit increased in the value of x, the conditional expectation
of y increases by a1 units.
In many cases, such linear relationship may not hold, so is necessary to
propose a quadratic model y = a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + ", in general, the expected
value of y could be polynomial of an n-th degree like y = a0 + a1x + a2x2 +
a3x3 + · · ·+ anxn + ".
The Polynomial Regression model
yi = a0 + a1xi + a2x
2
i + · · ·+ amxmi + "i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) (2.5)
can be expressed as a matrix form [34]. Then the model can be written as
a system of linear equations:0BBBBB@
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yn
1CCCCCA =
0BBBBB@
1 x1 x21 . . . x
m
1
1 x2 x22 . . . x
m
2
1 x3 x23 . . . x
m
3
...
...
...
...
1 xn x2n . . . x
m
n
1CCCCCA
0BBBBB@
a0
a1
a2
...
am
1CCCCCA+
0BBBBB@
"1
"2
"3
...
"n
1CCCCCA
The rest of the equations are the same to Linear Regression. The main
di↵erence between Linear and Polynomial Regression is working with non-
linear unknown variables. Also, the linear features of Linear Regression could
be taken and rebuilt, creating new non-linear features. Something similar
was made for the experiments performed for the WHOIS Similarity Distance
algorithm.
2.3.2.4 Learning curve of the classifiers
For measuring the quality of the WHOIS Similarity Distance method was used
learning curve . Learning curve refers to a plot of the prediction accuracy or
error, versus the training set size; that is how better the model can predict
the target as increasing number of instances used to train it.
The Figure 2.6 shows an example of how a Learning Curve should look.
The x-axis is the number of samples and the y-axis is the score of the predic-
tion. The above line represents the curve of the same model using samples set
for training and a distinct set for testing (training score). The bottom line
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Figure 2.6: An example of how the Learning Curve looks.
represents the curve of the model using the same samples set for training and
testing (cross-validation score). However, the score can be between 0 and 1.
When the score is closer to 1, means that the quality of the model is good,
otherwise, when the score is closer to 0, the quality of the design is wrong.
The linear models algorithm to be compared are linear regression, poly-
nomial regression with degree 2 and with degree 3 [33]. The set of figures 2.7
show the learning curves of the studied classifiers. For the experiment was
used the training dataset elements and the cross-validation was performed
using K-Fold technique. K-Fold splits data in into k-consecutive folds to get
train/test sets. Each fold is then used once as a validation while the k - 1
remaining folds form the training set.
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(a) Linear regression with 20,000 samples. The
score is around 0.8.
(b) Linear regression with 80,000 samples. The
score is slightly higher than 0.8.
(c) Polynomial regression with degree 2 and
20,000 samples. The score is around 0.97.
(d) Polynomial Regression with degree 2 and
80,000 samples. The score is around 0.97.
(e) Polynomial regression with degree 3 and
20,000 samples.
(f) Polynomial regression with degree 3 and
80,000 samples.
Figure 2.7: Learning curve of the linear models proposed in this thesis with
20% of sample as testing samples. Polynomial regression with degree 2 and 3
has better score than the linear regression.
In the set of figures 2.7, the lines explained before, are not well appreciated.
That means the scoring of the cross-validation and the training score are
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slightly similar.
The figures 2.7a and 2.7b show the Learning Curve of the Linear Regres-
sion algorithm with di↵erent size of samples. The score is slightly improving
according to as samples sizes increase. Again, the score is in the range of 0.76
and 0.80.
The figures 2.7c and 2.7d show Polynomial Regression with degree 2 and
with di↵erent size of samples. The score is slightly constant according to as
samples sizes increase. The score is moving around the score 0.97. The results
of polynomial regression with degree 2 are better than the particular results
of Linear Regression.
The figures 2.7e and 2.7f show Polynomial Regression with degree 3 and
with di↵erent size of samples. With small sample sizes, the score is not well
appreciated. As the sample size increases, the score is getting constant and
it is around 0.99. According to this, with large samples sizes the Polynomial
Regression with degree 3 is better than polynomial regression with degree 2.
2.3.2.5 Mean Squared Error of WHOIS Similarity Distance using
training dataset
In this section, the reader can see how we have chosen the most suitable clas-
sifier to connect domains using their similarities in the WHOIS information.
The analyzed classifiers of linear models were: Linear Regression, Polynomial
Regression with degree 2 and degree 3.
The experiments were made getting the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the
predicted relationship between domains. The plots 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 show a
relation between the distance values with the MSE obtained comparing real
target and the target predicted by the WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm.
The x-axis represents the numeric distance value and y-axis is the MSE. If the
MSE of a relationship is closer to one means that it has high odds have been
wrong predicted, otherwise if the MSE is close to 0, says that the target was
predicted correctly with high chances. The size of the testing samples is 20%
with respect the total number of samples. For the next experiments were only
used the dataset for training.
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(a) Linear regression with 20,000 samples.
(b) Linear regression with 80,000 samples.
Figure 2.8: MSE of the Linear Regression classifier with GD value obtained.
Linear regression produces in average a MSE high with respect the rest of the
classifier. It means that the odds of bad predictions are high as the size of
samples increases.
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(a) Polynomial regression with degree 2 and 20,000 samples.
(b) Polynomial regression with degree 2 and 80,000 samples.
Figure 2.9: MSE of the Polynomial Regression with degree 2 with GD value
obtained. Polynomial regression with degree 2 produces in average a MSE low
with respect to the rest of the classifier, but it is not the best MSE produced.
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(a) Polynomial regression with degree 3 and 20,000 samples.
(b) Polynomial regression with degree 3 and 80,000 samples.
Figure 2.10: MSE of the polynomial regression with degree 3 with GD value
obtained. Polynomial regression with degree 3 produces in average the lowest
MSE with respect to the rest of the studied classifier. Low MSE means that
the odds of bad predictions are low as the size of samples increases.
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(a) The test sample size is the 80% with respect to the total num-
bers of samples provided. Polynomial regression with degree 3
has the lowest MSE, with small samples size can get MSE higher
than the average. However when the sample sizes increases, the
MSE is more constant.
(b) The test sample size is the 20% with respect to the total
numbers of samples provided. Polynomial regression with degree
3 has the lowest MSE, and it looks constant as the samples sizes
increases.
Figure 2.11: Comparison of the studied classifiers. X-axis is the number of
samples provided and the y-axis is the MSE obtained. It is provided two
plots, one with the test sample size of 20% and the another one with 80%.
The polynomial regression with degree 3 has the lowest MSE, so is highly
likelihood, that it can predict correctly. Thus, polynomial regression with
degree 3 is more suitable than the others classifiers for our method WHOIS
Relation Algorithm 33
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In the Figure 2.11 shows that Polynomial Regression with degree 3 is more
suitable than the other classifiers for our method WHOIS Similarity Distance.
The error of the prediction is little, and it maintains constant on the samples
size.
2.3.2.6 Experiments with testing dataset
In the section before, were compared the di↵erent studied classifiers looking
for the most suitable classifier for our case using dataset for training. The
most appropriate linear model classifier according to the MSE experiment is
the Polynomial Regression with degree 3.
In this section initially, The WHOIS Similarity Distance is compared with
the predicted relationship of the Polynomial Regression with degree 3. Then
the MSE is plotted and also, the confusion matrix is showed. At the end of
this section, the reader can see a statistic table where can be analyzed with
more details the results obtained.
For the next comparison and experiments were used all the elements of
the training dataset to teach the selected classifier, around 134000 elements.
And for testing the algorithm were used all the testing dataset around 34000
items. The testing dataset was not used before.
The Figure 2.12 shows us that the comparative with the testing dataset
looks similar to the comparatives performed in the section 2.3.3. The mean
and the R2 are almost equals. Figure 2.14 explains the MSE of the Polynomial
Regression with degree 3 using the testing dataset. The error still is small,
and it could be able to predict correctly almost 99% of the cases. The Figure
2.13 shows the confusion matrix of the predicted values.
The table 2.4 shows several metrics used to analyze the results of linear
models classifiers. The statistics measures that we are interested are:
• The Kappa coe cient is 0.99,
• The Matthews correlation coe cient is 0.99,
• The F1 score is 0.99,
• The accuracy is 0.99,
• The percentage of error of the total number of predictions is 0.112%.
Thus, we conclude that the method of classification based on WHOIS
Similarity Distance using the Polynomial Regression model with degree 3, has
an accuracy between 98% and 99%. This accuracy with respect to the data
provided by our built dataset.
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Classes: (related, unrelated)
Testing population: 34554
Condition positive: 6167
Condition negative: 28387
Test outcome positive: 6128
Test outcome negative: 28426
True Positive (TP): 6128
True Negative (TN): 28387
False Positive (FP): 0
False Negative (FN): 39
Sensivity (TPR): 0.993676017513
TNR = Specificity (SPC): 1.0
Pos Pred Value (PPV) = Precision : 1.0
Negative Pred Value (NPV): 0.998628016605
False-out (FPR): 0.0
False Discovery Rate (FDR): 0.0
Miss Rate (FNR): 0.00632398248743
Accuracy (ACC): 0.998871331828
F1 score: 0.996827978853
Matthews Correlation Coe cient (MCC): 0.996148939926
Informedness: 0.993676017513
Markedness: 0.998628016605
Cohen’s kappa coe cient: 0.996141525
Prevalence: 0.178474272154
Positive Likelihood Ratio (LR+): inf
Negative Likelihood Ratio (LR-): 0.00632398248743
Diagnostic Odds Ratio (DOR): inf
False Omission Rate (FOR): 0.00137198339548
Error : 0.112%
Table 2.4: The results obtanied after to apply several metrics to evaluate
classification models specifically on linear models. The statistics measures
that we are more interested are: Kappa coe cient with 0.99, MCC with 0.99,
F1 score with 0.99, ACC with 0.99 and the percentage of error of the total
number of predictions with 0.112 %.
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Figure 2.12: The Figure is showing the comparative between the WHOIS
Similarity Distance algorithm and the predicted values of the classifier. The
training of the classifier Polynomial Regression with degree 3 was made with all
the data available in dataset of training. The predicted values were obtained
and validated using the testing dataset.
2.3.3 Comparative study of the relationship between the
WHOIS Similarity Distance and the classifiers
The following comparatives show a relation between WHOIS Similarity Dis-
tance value and the values predicted by the classifiers. For these comparatives
was used the training dataset. The y-axis represents the Global Distance or
WHOIS Similarity Distance value and x-axis are allocated the size of the
samples. In the figures were used some references to make easier to under-
stand the comparisons:
• The Coe cient of Determination R2, also denoted as r2, is a num-
ber that indicates the proportion of the variance in the dependent vari-
able that is predictable from the independent variable(s). It goes in the
range of 0 to 1. When the value is close to 1, the linear model method
predicts better results.
• Mean µ.
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Figure 2.13: The confusion matrix shows us that around the 99% of the de-
cisions made with respect to the relationship of the domains were correct. It
was used the testing dataset and the linear regression with degree 3.
• Median.
• Standard Deviation  
• ⇥, domains which were correctly related.
• ·, domains which were correctly unrelated.
• }, domains which were incorrectly related.
• N, domains which were incorrectly unrelated.
In the Figure 2.15 shows the results obtained using Linear Regression
with respect the values of the GD. The value R2 of this model is around
80.2%, does not improve with high significant when the numbers of samples
increase. It could mean that the linear regression was performed with its
maximal potential for this problem. Also, Linear Regression predicted in
wrong way several comparisons. And as the size of samples increases the
number of wrong predictions also increase.
In the Figure 2.16 shows a relation between the values of the GD obtained
with a classifier polynomial regression with degree 2, the R2 is around 97%,
better than the R2 obtained with the linear regression model. Also, the R2
does not increase with respect the number of samples. The R2 is an excellent
value, and it says that the polynomial regression with degree 2 could suit our
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problem. However, we can appreciate that the Polynomial Regression with
degree 2 has some wrong predictions. Polynomial Regression with degree 2 has
more wrong prediction than polynomial regression with degree 3; this can be
appreciated in the Figure 2.16. Further the R2 of the Polynomial Regression
with degree 3 is around 99% and also it looks almost constant with respect
the number of samples provided. Again, polynomial regression with degree 3
has better results than polynomial regression with degree 2.
The plots also show that the majority of the related domains have a nu-
meric distance close to 0 and the majority of unrelated domains have a numeric
distance greater than 40. That is, when the Global Distance of two domains,
is closer to zero the probability to be related is higher.
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Figure 2.14: The MSE of the WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm obtained
using the testing dataset and the classifier of linear regression with degree 3.
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(a) Linear regression algorithm: with 20,000 samples. It has R2
of 80% and an SE of 0.0063.
(b) Linear regression with 80,000 samples. It has R2 of 80% and
an SE of 0.0032.
Figure 2.15: Results of Linear Regression with a sample size of 20%. The
results show the Linear Regression could not relate or unrelated correctly
several domains. And as the size of samples increases the number of wrong
predictions also increase. Also the plots show that the majority of the related
domains have a numeric distance close to 0 and the unrelated domains have
a numeric distance greater than 40.
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(a) Polynomial regression with degree 2 and 20,000 samples. It
has R2 of 97% and an SE of 0.0026.
(b) Polynomial regression with degree 2 and 80,000 samples. It
has R2 of 97% and an SE of 0.0013.
Figure 2.16: Results of Polynomial Regression, degree 2 with a sample size of
20%. The numbers of wrong prediction is lower than Polynomial Regression
with respect to Linear Regression.
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(a) Polynomial regression with degree 3 and 20,000 samples. It
has R2 of 99% and an SE of 0.0013.
(b) Polynomial regression with degree 3 and 80,000 samples. It
has R2 of 99% and an SE of 0.0007.
Figure 2.17: Results of Polynomial Regression degree 3 with a sample size of
20%. The numbers of wrong prediction is lower than Polynomial Regression
with degree 2.
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Chapter 3
ManaTI Software
This Chapter describes the development of ManaTI.
ManaTI provides a GUI for visualizing weblogs and has several tools to
increase the e ciency of the analyst analyzing weblogs files. ManaTI is highly
scalable, giving the possibilities to develop easily more features. And also, it
provides an API, so the users can create their modules and connect them to
ManaTI without needing to understand many technical details of the system.
3.1 Description of functionalities
In this section, the most important features of ManaTI are described. How
they work and how they were developed. All the features of ManaTI before
to be developed, they were analyzed and decided meticulously in monthly
meetings through all the development process, with the Cisco’s analysts and
the members of the ManaTI project.
Further, after each stable version of ManaTI deployed during the develop-
ment process, was received feedback from the Cisco’s analysts. This situation
contributed to adapt the features and GUI of ManaTI according to the real
needs of the analysts.
3.1.1 Table to visualize weblogs files and simple labeling of
weblogs
This function allows to the user to upload the files and visualize them in the
table. Where the user can filter or search in the rows by any text, regular
expression or by labels.
Further, the table allows paginating the rows and choice the number of
rows per page that you want to see. The Figure 3.2 shows an illustration of
the dynamic table UI see. To achieve the dynamic table is used the jQuery
plug-in Datatable.
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Figure 3.1: Workflow of the functions of ManaTI.
Figure 3.2: ManaTI table UI.
ManaTI supports Bro15 weblog format and a custom format file used by
Cisco, which looks like a CSV file. To parse the format files was is implemented
a logic in the source file reader files.js. For the implementation was necessary
to uses several external libraries and source optimization to make the process
to upload fast and e cient.
ManaTI was thought initially to work only with the Cisco custom format,
but after a time the functionality to see and analyze the Bro HTTP files in
ManaTI was added.
For labeling manually weblogs or simple labeling, the user has to select one
or many weblogs, one after another, perform right click over it and then choose
the label or verdict that the user believes suitable for the selected weblog. The
15www.bro.org
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the process to label one or many weblogs manually in
the table.
Figure 3.3: The images shows the process to label several weblogs and then
apply a verdict. The rows with a darker background are weblogs selected.
The rows with white background are weblogs have not been selected and with
undefined verdict.
3.1.2 Exporting weblogs
ManaTI allows to the user to export the content of the dynamic table with
the verdicts assigned in several formats like CSV, Excel files or copy in the
clipboard. It is useful for the analyst to export the analysis in di↵erent formats
and it can use them for many purpose or many other tools that the analyst
uses.
3.1.3 Bulk labeling
The idea of Bulk Labeling is to facilitate the weblogs’ labeling process made
by the user.
Using the menu context shown when you perform right click, then “Mark
all WBs with same:” and you can choose if “by IP” or “by Domain”, also it
indicates the column name of the file where it takes the information and the
numbers of weblogs will be a↵ected after applying the operation. In Figure
3.4 shows a screenshot of the necessary steps to perform a mass-tagged.
The implementation of this function was hard because was used techniques
on JavaScript to do background processing or “multitasking”, called Workers.
In Figure 3.5 shows the implementation of the Bulk Labeling with the Workers.
3.1.4 Intelligence Tools
Often analysts check several websites or services with information about rank-
ing of domains, WHOIS information, IPs, and others. Several sites provide
reputation information of domains, IPs or file hash. The most common are
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Figure 3.4: Option of BL in the menu context on ManaTI.
Figure 3.5: Implementation of Bulk Labeling using Workers in JavasScript.
VirusTotal16, PassiveTotal17, Metadefender18 and others. And also like was
explained before the analysts contently consult the WHOIS information of the
domains.
Because that, in the menu context was added an option to get information
from VirusTotal (using its API) and also the user has the possibility to consult
the WHOIS information. In both cases, the user can choose how to do the
consultation using domain name or IP.
The Figure 3.6 shows an example of how looks the information obtained
from VirusTotal using the provided IP and the Figure 3.8 shows another ex-
amples but providing a domain name. Once the user selects the way how to
16www.virustotal.com/
17www.passivetotal.org
18www.metadefender.com
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make the request, by IP or by Domain, an internal window or modal (also
called pop-in) is displayed where the user can see the requested information.
The response can take time if the query was not performed before and stored
in the ManaTI database.
Figure 3.6: Menucontext option to get external information.
Figure 3.7: Modal showing the information returned by VirusTotal given an
IP address.
All the queries performed to get information from VirusTotal or WHOIS
data by domains or IPs, are storage in the database. The goal is to have
a history changes for the future and also, for avoiding duplicated requests,
improving in that way the time to show information in the modal.
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Figure 3.8: Modal showing the information returned by VirusTotal given a
Domain Name .
3.1.5 Statistics Section
When the analysts are reviewing some weblog file looking for malicious or
suspicious weblog, is common that they need statistics information, e.g. how
many times some domain or IP is used in the whole file, therefore is developed
a section on the web page to put that kind of information. The information
provided is the number of domains/IP and how many time they appears in
the weblogs file analyzed. The Figure 3.9 illustrates the statistics area.
Often the weblogs files have more than 1000 lines (or rows) so can be time-
consuming to the JavasScript analyses the whole data looking for statistics
information. Thus the user experience could be a↵ected. To do this totally
transparent for the user was implemented a FlowsProcessed() class in the
struct helper.js file and the class was instanced using Workers. The Figure
3.10 shows the implementation of the logic for processing the weblogs and
displaying statistics area. For seeing the statistics section is not necessary to
have the weblogs file stored in the database.
3.1.6 Comments
Exist the possibility to do comments per analysis sessions, so the users can
add notes about the weblogs analyzed. This features is important because for
example the analysts can notify to another analysts about possible malware
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Figure 3.9: Statistics section view. It is showing how many times an IP or
domain appears in the weblogs file and in which column.
Figure 3.10: Implementation when the class FlowsProcessed() is instanced
using Workers.
activity detected in the file or suspicious domains found. The Figure 3.11
shows the UI to do comments in the analysis sessions.
3.1.7 Anonymous Users and Sessions shared
ManaTI is a web application and has a module of user authentication, roles
and permissions to control the user activity inside the system. So the users
to get access to the system need corresponding credentials, username and
password. However, it is also possible that some users wants to show some
analysis to someone without access to the system to get some feedback.
Thanks to the UI of ManaTI to read and interpret weblogs files is easier
than only watching them in a plain text. Hence is implemented the possibility
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Figure 3.11: Text area to provide comments in the analysis session UI.
to post analysis sessions and make them public. Thus, users without access to
the system could see the analysis session posted and work with them without
a↵ecting the database of the web application. They are called Anonymous
Users (AU) .
Further, the AU can export the analysis session with the labels. Also, the
Anonymous Users can upload new files without the possibility to save them in
the database. The External Modules can still help the AU to find malicious
weblogs or improve its labeling process.
3.1.8 History of changes
Often the analysts cannot remember all the decision taken in all the weblogs
analyzed. In ManaTI is developed a function to see all the changes made to
a particular weblog. The Figure 3.12 demonstrates how to look the history
of changes modal of one selected weblog. The function to show the history of
changes is located in the menu context.
To store all the changes of one weblog, made by users or External Modules,
is implemented a model WeblogHistory. If the reader wants to know more
details about the database model of ManaTI, Could go to the Appendix C.
Every time that the user changes the verdict (or label) of one weblog,
one WeblogHistory is created. By default all the weblogs have the verdict
undefined assigned.
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Figure 3.12: History of changes of a weblog. It is possible to see in the modal,
the users or modules that have labeled the weblog during the time.
3.1.9 External Modules
The goals of the external modules are to help the analyst to detect and label
weblogs faster. So was developed an API where the analyst can use it for
creating its Python scripts.
With the external modules, the user could be able to do heavy processing
using a significant amount of data. Therefore, all the modules are running in
background tasks (multi-threading). The modules’ processing is not a↵ecting
the user experience and the web server performance. For the implementation
was necessary to create a Django application, and the API implementation,
abstract class and a database model for external modules.
One external module to bulk labeling by domain was developed and called
Bulk Labeling. The module works with the next logic: when the user labels
one weblog (or many), the module will use the domain name of the labeled
weblog, and it will search for all the weblogs in the database with the same
domain name assigned, and tag them with the same verdict of initial weblog.
3.1.10 WHOIS Similarity Distance Module
The WDS algorithm explained before in the Chapter 2 was implemented as
an external module in ManaTI.
It allows to the user to select one specified domain and search for all
the related domains inside the file. Also, there is a function to label all the
connected domains that have being found. Both functions described are in
the background and totally transparent to the user. This feature is allocated
in the menu context.
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3.1.11 Metrics
For measuring the performance of web application, is implemented a logic to
get data from the front-end (GUI) and save them in the database. The data
is only used to measure if ManaTI is useful for the analysts or not.
The logic in the front-end to record the events produced by the user in
the GUI is located in the class Metrics, which is implemented in the file
metrics logic.js.
The Metrics class has methods that are called when some events occur in
the GUI, e.g. the user labels a weblog, uploads some file or others events. The
register of an event is temporally stored in a local database inside the browser
called localStorage. Each minute the synchronization process starts and the
data collected is sent to the web server and saved in the database of ManaTI.
3.2 Software Development Methodology
For the development of ManaTI, was used the Kanban methodology [35],
specifically the Kanban cards, through the web tool MeisterTask19. Kanban
is an agile work methodology that allows adapting quickly to changes that
arise when developing a project.
During the 40s, Toyota created a better engineering process for the su-
permarket. The grocers’ “just-in-time” delivery process did that the Toyota
engineers think about their methods to control the inventory. In simplest
words, ”by better communication through visual management” [36]. Kanban
is Japanese word for ”visual signal” or “card.” Toyota workers used a kanban
to mark steps in their development process [36] [35].
Kanban Principles principles
• Guaranteed Quality. Everything done must go well at first, there is
no margin of error. Hence in Kanban does not reward the speed, but
the final quality of the tasks performed. It is based on the fact that it
often costs more to fix it than to do it right the first time.
• Reduction of waste. Kanban is based on doing only what is right and
necessary, but doing it well. This supposes the reduction of everything
that is superficial or secondary (principle YAGNI)
• Continuous improvement. Kanban is not merely a management
method, but also a system of improvement in the development of pro-
jects, according to the objectives to be achieved.
• Flexibility. The next thing to do is to decide the backlog (or accu-
mulated pending tasks), being able to prioritize those incoming tasks
19www.meistertask.com
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according to the needs of the moment (ability to respond to unforeseen
tasks [37].
3.3 Software Resources used
Detail of all the resources software required to develop ManaTI.
• Programming Language Python. It is a high-level programming
language created by Guido van Rossum. Python is an interpreted lan-
guage and has a philosophy which emphasizes code readability. It has
very simple syntax, easily scalable, is very fast and flexible. Python
is free and open source and is widely used in educational environments
around the world [38] [39]. There are a lot of documentation and a great
support of the community. ManaTI was developed with Python version
2.7.
• Web Application Framework Django. It is an open-source web
framework made in (and for) Python, Django follows the mode-view-
template (or MVT) architectural pattern and is maintained by an inde-
pendent organization called Django Software Foundation (DSF). Django
also follows the Python’s philosophy, trying to be simple, scalable, rapid
development and respects the principle of “don’t repeat yourself” or just
DRY20. The figure 3.13 shows the summary of the workflow of Django
[40].
Figure 3.13: Illustration of the Workflow of Django.
20www.djangoproject.com
53
3. ManaTI Software
• Database Engine PostgresSQL. PostgreSQL21 is an object-relational
database management system, distributed under the BSD license and
freely available source code. It is one of the most powerful open source
database management system on the market and in its latest versions
has nothing to envy to other commercial databases.
PostgreSQL uses a client-server model and uses multiprocessing instead
of multithreading to ensure system stability. A failure in one of the
processes will not a↵ect the rest and the system will continue to function.
The system was developed using this database engine because it is in-
tegrated in an easy way to the Django framework allowing to make
operations to the database from the business layer without having to
implement business logic in the database.
• JavaScript and external libraries. It is a high-level, dynamic, un-
typed, and interpreted programming language and used is one of the
three core technologies of in World Wide Web (WWW). It has been
standardized in the ECMAScript language specification [41].
One of the most important aspects of ManaTI is its User-Interface (UI),
to make it as friendly as possible was used several JavaScript (JS) lib-
raries and others implementations. Two of the most used JS libraries in
this project were jQuery22 and DataTable23 .
jQuery is a cross-platform JavaScript library designed to simplify the
client-side scripting of HTML.
DataTable “is a plug-in for the jQuery JavaScript library. It is a highly
flexible tool, based upon the foundations of progressive enhancement,
and will add advanced interaction controls to any HTML table”.
• Compatible browsers. ManaTI is only compatible with Chrome ver-
sion 56+.
• Operative System. ManaTI was developed in macOS, but also it is
compatible with any Linux distro based on Debian with Python version
2.7 installed.
• VCS Git and repository. Git is a reliable, versatile and multipur-
pose Version Control System (VCS). It was designed by Linus Torvalds,
thinking about the e ciency and reliability of the maintenance of ver-
sions of applications when they have a large number of source files. It is
free and open-source24.
21www.postgresql.org
22https://jquery.com
23https://datatables.net
24https://git-scm.com
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The ManaTI source code was storage in Bitbucket25. It is a web-based
hosting service for projects using the Mercurial and Git revision control
system. Bitbucket o↵ers free and commercial plans.
• IDE PyCharm. It is an Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
used in programming, specifically for the Python language. It provides
code analysis, a graphical debugger, an integrated unit testing, integra-
tion with version control systems (VCS), and supports web development
with Django. It is developed by JetBrains [42].
• Task Manager MeisterTask. It is an intuitive online task manager
that uses smart integrations and task automation to make your team
more productive. MeisterTask26 uses cards based on Kanban method-
ology. The Figure 3.14 illustrates how the dashboard on ManaTI in
MeiterTask looks.
Figure 3.14: Dashboard of ManaTI project in MeisterTask.
3.4 Experiments and discussion
The idea of the test is proved if ManaTI assists appropriately to the analysts
or not. The experiment was planned as following:
• First, were selected, six people. Three of them are professional threat
analyst and 3 are IT professional working in the area of web development.
25www.bitbucket.com
26www.meistertask.com
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• Second, were chosen eight weblogs file, provided by Stratosphere project
27. All the files are tra c captured of well-known malware. Each file
had between 2,000 and 3,000 rows (weblogs) to analyze.
• Then, were created two instances of ManaTI called instances A and B.
They were hosted on a server that belongs to Stratosphere Lab.
– Instance A: It had the last developed version of ManaTI, with all
the function listed before. The WHOIS Distance module was un-
able for the experiments because was detected a performance prob-
lem. This issue could a↵ect the resources of the server and con-
sequently, others services deployed on the server.
– Instance B: All the analyst tools and features developed in ManaTI
were disconnected, with exception to the dynamic table to visualize
weblogs files and the possibility to assign verdict.
• The users were provided with proper credentials to both instances.
• Each user had to analyze four weblogs files in one instance and oth-
ers four files in another one. With anticipation, the weblogs files were
determined to be used in one or another instance.
• The three users non-professional threat analyst were introduced in the
topic with an explanation video and manuals about how to use ManaTI
and how to analyze weblogs. Also, they were practicing with ManaTI
one week before to start the experiments. To understand the function-
alities of ManaTI and how they work. The others three users, profes-
sionals threat analysts, already had used ManaTI and also, they have
been participating in the whole process of ManaTI development.
• Thence, the users had two weeks to finish the experiment. A button to
close analyzing session was implemented, so the users could determine
when the analysis of one file was done.
• When all the users finished their reviews, the performance metrics col-
lected were extracted from the database to be analyzed.
3.4.1 Results
The performance metrics were processed and the results are in the table 3.1.
References to the table 3.1:
Av. # of labels/ # weblogs It is the mean number of labeled in total
over the average of the number of weblogs to be labeled per analysis.
27https://stratosphereips.org/category/dataset.html
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Instance Av. # of labels / # weblogs Av. labels/sec Av. labels/min
A 1304.34/3339.83 17.832 31.334
B 75.25/2518.75 6.779 9.354
Table 3.1: Results obtained of the experiments performed in ManaTI. The user
in average are more productive using the instance A then using the instance B.
The instance A had all the tools implemented in ManaTI working, although
the instance B only had the dynamic table working.
Av. labels/sec It is the average number of labeled per seconds. Only
moments with reported activities were used. Moments, where the user was
doing nothing, were discarded.
Av. labels/min It is the average number of labeled per minutes. Again
only were taken moments with reported activities.
The first column, the number of labeled in the instance A are bigger than
the same column in the instance B. This situation is due to two condition.
First, the users after a time analyzing in the instance B did not want to
continues or to spend more time in that. So they just labeled representatives
weblogs and then decide to close the analysis. And second, the instance A
had several tools for mass-tagged (bulk labeling). They made a big di↵erent
in the statistics.
The second column, in the instance A the average number of labeled per
seconds by the users is higher than the results obtained in the instance B. This
situation is also repeated in the last column, where the labels are evaluated
per minutes. Similar to the first column, the tools for bulking labeling made a
di↵erence at the moment to estimate the number of verdicts applied per unit
time. Using the data obtained the labeling process in the instance A were
faster than the instance B by a factor 3.4 times.
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Conclusion
In this thesis we researched, created and published a new tool, called the
ManaTI, to assist the network security analysts to find threats in the net-
work. It has two primary goals: First, to assist the analysts in evaluating
the network tra c to find better and process the information. Second, to re-
search a machine learning method that can confidently identify domains which
WHOIS information is related. Our algorithm is both a WHOIS classification
tool of similar domains or as a WHOIS similarity distance.
For the experiments with the WHOIS similarity distance, we worked with
a dataset of WHOIS records made by us with approximately 1,300 di↵erent
domains. They were hand labeled by experts in the area based on a manual
inspection. We conclude that this manual labeling was paramount for training
the algorithms with precise data. We also find that our use of the PassiveTotal
library proved to be most e↵ective to get the WHOIS records.
For the experiments to evaluate ManaTI, we asked real network analysts
to evaluate real malware weblogs obtained from the Stratosphere project. We
concluded that this combination of analysts and malware contributed to re-
produce the most realistic environments to work on. The feedback received by
the professional threat analysts after the experiment was valuable. With it,
we found some weaknesses of ManaTI that are currently under improvement.
Our general conclusions about the techniques are that:
• The WHOIS information for domains registered for the same purpose are
not entirely similar, but in most cases, they share enough information to
be measurable by our distance metric. Also, we found it very common
for entities to hire third-party companies to register their domains to
maintain certain privacy in the WHOIS records. These cases were the
most di cult ones to classify.
• There are WHOIS information fields which are more important to relate
domains than others fields.
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• The 3rd-degree Polynomial Regression algorithm was the most suitable
for our WHOIS Similarity Distance method.
• The accuracy of the WHOIS similarity distance algorithm is around
98%.
• ManaTI can increase the speed of the security analysts in studying un-
known tra c by a factor of 3.4.
In summary, ManaTI is a useful tool for the threats analysts that can help
them speed up the finding of more and better information in web network
tra c. It is still a prototype, but we got good results in real environments.
Moreover, it is used actively by the Cisco company. Further, the ManaTI
project is supported by Cisco in the Stratosphere Lab28 was renovated one
year more. It reflects the confidence of the Cisco company with the work
made in ManaTI. Despite our experiments, designs, and datasets, ManaTI is
an evolving tool, and it needs to be improved. This is because Cisco Systems
is currently using it for real analysis, and therefore there are more features
requests to implement, especially in the area of machine learning. Our future
work can be divided in:
1. To implement active learning techniques on ManaTI by learning from
the analysts. Since ManaTI remembers how the users used the system,
it is possible to model this behavior and teach ManaTI how to work
better.
2. To show the users, the statistics graphs of their performance in real time,
to help them measure their progress in real time.
3. To develop a new WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm using others
techniques, a new classifier like SVM or applying Neural Networks (NN).
4. To implement a module for detecting malicious domains using some of
the techniques already studied.
5. To use more and di↵erent domains in the training of the classifier and
distance measure.
6. To better help the analysts by incorporating the new scenarios of analysis
used by Cisco’s researchers.
28Project Reference: 13141/830-8301351C009, AIC Group, Department of Computer Sci-
ence, CTU University
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AppendixA
Abbreviations
AI Artificially Intelligent.
API Application Program Interface.
AS Autonomous Systems.
AU Anonymous Users.
C&C Command and Control.
ccTLDs country code Top-Level Domains.
DNS Domain Name Service.
DoS Denial-of-Service.
DSF Django Software Foundation.
FPR False Positive Rate.
gTLDs generic Top-Level Domains.
GUI Graphic Users-Interface.
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol.
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure.
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
IDE Integrated Development Environment.
IP Internet Protocol.
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Abbreviations
IPS Intrusion Prevention System.
IT Information Technology.
JS JavaScript.
ML Machine Learning.
MSE Mean Squared Error.
MVT Mode-View-Template.
NN Neural Networks.
PCAP Packet Capture.
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic.
SML Supervised Machine Learning.
SVM Support Vector Machine.
TLDs Top-Level Domains.
TPR True Positive Rate.
UI User-Interface.
URL Uniform Resource Locator.
VCS Version Control System.
WWW World Wide Web.
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Contents of CD
readme.txt ....................... the file with CD contents description
manati project..................ManaTI Web Application source code
api managerDjango app. to provide the API for the external modules
examples weblogs........Examples of files compatible with ManaTI
login ....Django app. for user authentication, roles and permissions
logs.................Directory of logs files generated in the ManaTI
manati.........Main directory of Django project, it has files settings
manati ui...........Django app. with the source for the ManaTI UI
share modules.......Implementations to be shared in all the Django
applications inside ManaTI
static .......... Javascript and CSS files shared between the Django
applications
templates..........Views or HTML files shared between the Django
applications
requirements.txt.................Python libraries used in ManaTI
manage.py...Django file to create applications, changes the database,
run the Django server, and many other task
README.txt.contains a description about ManaTI and instructions to
install it
manati experiments........The instances and weblogs files used for the
experiments on ManaTI
WSD .Experiments, dataset, source code and others assets used to develop
the method WHOIS Similarity Distances
datasetThe dataset used for WHOIS Similarity Distance experiments
experiments notes......Source code used for the WSD experiments
source......The source of the WHOIS Similarity Distance algorithm
thesis book...........The directory of LATEX source codes of the thesis
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AppendixC
Database Model
Figure C.1: Database Model of ManaTI.
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